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001			16635637
003			BD-DhUL
005			20161116112208.0
008			110203s2011 maua b 001 0 eng
010			_a 2011001480
020			_a9781444333350 (pbk.)
040			_aDLC _cDLC _dDLC _dBD-DhUL
042			_apcc
050	0	0	_aB105.E9 _bA35 2011
082	0	0	_a128.4 _222 _bADM
084			_aPHI011000 _2bisacsh
245	0	4	_aThe admissible contents of experience / _cedited by Katherine Hawley and Fiona Macpherson.
260			_aChichester, West Sussex, UK ; _aMalden, MA : _bWiley-Blackwell, _c2011.
300			_a200 p. : _bill. ; _c23 cm.
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505	8		_aMachine generated contents note: Introduction (Katherine Hawley, University of St. Andrews and Fiona Macpherson, University of Glasgow). -- 1. Perception And The Reach Of Phenomenal Content (Tim Bayne, University of Oxford). -- 2. Seeing Causings And Hearing Gestures (Steven Butterfill, University of Warwick). -- 3. Experience And Content (Alex Byrne, Massachusetts Institute of Technology). -- 4. Is Perception A Propositional Attitude? (Tim Crane, University College London). -- 5. Conscious Reference (Alva Noë, University of California, Berkeley). -- 6. What Are The Contents Of Experiences? (Adam Pautz, University of Texas at Austin). -- 7. Aspect-Switching And Visual Phenomenal Character (Richard Price, University of Oxford). -- 8. The Visual Experience Of Causation (Susanna Siegel, Harvard University). -- 9. The Admissible Contents Of Visual Experience (Michael Tye, University of Texas at Austin).
520			_a"Which objects and properties are represented in perceptual experience? Although perceptual experiences frequently give rise to beliefs, the content of these beliefs do not always simply reflect the contents of the experiences on which they are based. Instead, they often rest on background knowledge and beliefs, as well as experience. This raises the question of how are we able to determine what the admissible contents of experience are, whether they include singular or existential contents, and whether they include contents pertaining to causation or natural kinds. The papers in this collection address these issues, together with questions concerning the nature of perceptual content. They deal with the central issues of whether perceptual content is similar to the content of the propositional attitudes; whether all states with content fall neatly into the categories of either belief or experience. The book also focuses on whether there exists a continuum from states that are more like perceptual experiences to states that are more like belief, and, indeed, ultimately whether we should consider perceptual experiences to have content at all. This ground-breaking volume is published in association with the journal Philosophical Quarterly"-- _cProvided by publisher.
650		0	_aExperience.
650		0	_aPerception.
650		0	_aEvidence.
650		0	_aBelief and doubt.
650		7	_aPHILOSOPHY / Logic _2bisacsh.
700	1		_aHawley, Katherine _q(Katherine Jane)
700	1		_aMacpherson, Fiona.
856	4	2	_3Cover image _uhttp://catalogimages.wiley.com/images/db/jimages/9781444333350.jpg
906			_a7 _bcbc _corignew _d1 _eecip _f20 _gy-gencatlg
942			_2ddc _cBK
955			_bxj12 2011-02-03 _cxj12 2011-02-03 ONIX to ARS _axe11 2011-09-14 1 copy rec'd., to CIP ver.
999			_c124031 _d124031