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001			7698269
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008			940324s1994 ncu es|||||||| 2|eng|
020			_a9780198235118
024	3		_a9780198235118
040			_aBIP US _dWaSeSS _cBD-DhUL
082			_a171.5 _bSCR
100	1		_aScheffler, Samuel _eAuthor
245	1	4	_aThe Rejection of Consequentialism _bA Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions /
250			_a2nd ed.,Reprint,Revised
260			_aNew York : _bOxford University Press, _c1994
300			_aviii, 196 p. : _c22 cm.
506			_aLicense restrictions may limit access.
520	8		_aAnnotation _bIn contemporary philosophy, substantive moral theories are typically classified as either consequentialist or deontological. Standard consequentialist theories insist, roughly, that agents must always act so as to produce the best available outcomes overall. Standard deontological theories,by contrast, maintain that there are some circumstances where one is permitted but not required to produce the best overall results, and still other circumstances in which one is positively forbidden to do so. Classical utilitarianism is the most familiar consequentialist view, but it is widely regarded as an inadequate account of morality. Although Professor Scheffler agrees with this assessment, he also believes that consequentialism seems initially plausible, and that there is a persistent air ofparadox surrounding typical deontological views. In this book, therefore, he undertakes to reconsider the rejection of consequentialism. He argues that it is possible to provide a rationale for the view that agents need not always produce the best possible overall outcomes, and this motivates one departure from consequentialism; but he shows that it is surprisingly difficult to provide a satisfactory rationale for the view thatthere are times when agents must not produce the best possible overall outcomes. He goes on to argue for a hitherto neglected type of moral conception, according to which agents are always permitted, but not always required, to produce the best outcomes.
521			_aCollege Audience _bOxford University Press, Incorporated
773		0	_tOxford Scholarship Online Philosophy
856	4	0	_uhttp://www.columbia.edu/cgi-bin/cul/resolve?clio7698269 _zFull text available from Oxford Scholarship Online Philosophy
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999			_c126464 _d126464