000			02142nam a22003378a 4500
001			CR9781139600521
003			UkCbUP
005			20180107143410.0
006			m|||||o||d||||||||
007			cr||||||||||||
008			121116s2013||||enk s ||1 0|eng|d
020			_a9781139600521 (ebook)
020			_z9781107039612 (hardback)
020			_z9781107519275 (paperback)
040			_aUkCbUP _cUkCbUP _erda
050	0	0	_aD639.S7 _bB33 2013
082	0	0	_a940.4/85641 _223
100	1		_aBeach, Jim, _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aHaig's Intelligence : _bGHQ and the German Army, 1916–1918 / [electronic resource] _cJim Beach.
264		1	_aCambridge : _bCambridge University Press, _c2013.
300			_a1 online resource (386 pages) : _bdigital, PDF file(s).
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
490	0		_aCambridge Military Histories
500			_aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 09 Oct 2015).
520			_aHaig's Intelligence is an important study of Douglas Haig's controversial command during the First World War. Based on extensive new research, it addresses a perennial question about the British army on the Western Front between 1916 and 1918: why did they think they were winning? Jim Beach reveals how the British perceived the German army through a study of the development of the British intelligence system, its personnel and the ways in which intelligence was gathered. He also examines how intelligence shaped strategy and operations by exploring the influence of intelligence in creating perceptions of the enemy. He shows for the first time exactly what the British knew about their opponent, when and how and, in so doing, sheds significant new light on continuing controversies about the British army's conduct of operations in France and Belgium and the relationship between Haig and his chief intelligence officer, John Charteris.
776	0	8	_iPrint version: _z9781107039612
830		0	_aCambridge Military Histories.
856	4	0	_uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139600521 _zCambridge Books Online
999			_c236388 _d236388