000 02266nam a22003498a 4500
001 CR9780511792458
003 UkCbUP
005 20180107143412.0
006 m|||||o||d||||||||
007 cr||||||||||||
008 100622s2011||||enk s ||1 0|eng|d
020 _a9780511792458 (ebook)
020 _z9781107004849 (hardback)
020 _z9780521181679 (paperback)
040 _aUkCbUP
_cUkCbUP
_erda
050 0 0 _aK4444
_b.B78 2012
082 0 0 _a343/.03
_223
100 1 _aBrummer, Chris,
_eauthor.
245 1 0 _aSoft Law and the Global Financial System :
_bRule Making in the 21st Century / [electronic resource]
_cChris Brummer.
246 3 _aSoft Law & the Global Financial System
264 1 _aCambridge :
_bCambridge University Press,
_c2011.
300 _a1 online resource (308 pages) :
_bdigital, PDF file(s).
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
500 _aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 09 Oct 2015).
520 _aThe global financial crisis of 2008 has given way to a proliferation of international agreements aimed at strengthening the prudential oversight and supervision of financial market participants. Yet how these rules operate is not well understood. Because international financial rules are expressed through informal, non-binding accords, scholars tend to view them as either weak treaty substitutes or by-products of national power. Rarely, if ever, are they cast as independent variables that can inform the behavior of regulators and market participants alike. This book explains how international financial law 'works' - and presents an alternative theory for understanding its purpose, operation and limitations. Drawing on a close institutional analysis of the post-crisis financial architecture, it argues that international financial law is often bolstered by a range of reputational, market and institutional mechanisms that make it more coercive than classical theories of international law predict.
650 0 _aGlobal Financial Crisis, 2008-2009
650 0 _aSoft law
776 0 8 _iPrint version:
_z9781107004849
856 4 0 _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511792458
_zCambridge Books Online
999 _c236503
_d236503