000 02256nam a22003738a 4500
001 CR9781139520126
003 UkCbUP
005 20180107143417.0
006 m|||||o||d||||||||
007 cr||||||||||||
008 120531s2013||||enk s ||1 0|eng|d
020 _a9781139520126 (ebook)
020 _z9781107033580 (hardback)
020 _z9781107541252 (paperback)
040 _aUkCbUP
_cUkCbUP
_erda
050 0 0 _aB2798
_b.G6845 2013
082 0 0 _a170.92
_223
100 1 _aGrenberg, Jeanine,
_eauthor.
245 1 0 _aKant's Defense of Common Moral Experience :
_bA Phenomenological Account / [electronic resource]
_cJeanine Grenberg.
264 1 _aCambridge :
_bCambridge University Press,
_c2013.
300 _a1 online resource (314 pages) :
_bdigital, PDF file(s).
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
490 0 _aModern European Philosophy
500 _aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 09 Oct 2015).
520 _aIn this book, Jeanine Grenberg argues that everything important about Kant's moral philosophy emerges from careful reflection upon the common human moral experience of the conflict between happiness and morality. Through careful readings of both the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason, Grenberg shows that Kant, typically thought to be an overly technical moral philosopher, in fact is a vigorous defender of the common person's first-personal encounter with moral demands. Grenberg uncovers a notion of phenomenological experience in Kant's account of the Fact of Reason, develops a new a reading of the Fact, and grants a moral epistemic role for feeling in grounding Kant's a priori morality. The book thus challenges readings which attribute only a motivational role to feeling; and Fichtean readings which violate Kant's commitments to the limits of reason. This study will be valuable to students and scholars engaged in Kant studies.
650 0 _aEthics
650 0 _aPhenomenology
650 0 _aPractical reason
776 0 8 _iPrint version:
_z9781107033580
830 0 _aModern European Philosophy.
856 4 0 _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139520126
_zCambridge Books Online
999 _c236813
_d236813