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Elhauge, Einer.

Statutory default rules : how to interpret unclear legislation / Einer Elhauge. - Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press, 2008. - vi, 386 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Why courts should maximize enactable preferences when statutes are unclear -- The general theory for current preferences default rules -- Inferring current preferences from recent legislative action -- Inferring current preferences from agency action -- From legislative intent to probabilistic estimates of enactable preferences -- Moderation, unforeseen circumstances, and a theory of meaning -- Eliciting legislative preferences -- Canons favoring the politically powerless -- Linguistic canons of statutory construction -- Interpretations that may create international conflict -- Explaining seeming inconsistencies in statutory stare decisis -- Tracking the preferences of political subunits -- Tracking high court preferences -- The fit with prior political science models and empirical data -- Interest groups and collective choice theory -- Protecting reliance or avoiding change or effect -- Rebutting operational and jurisprudential objections.

9780674024601 (alk. paper) 0674024605 (alk. paper)

2007014164


Statutes--United States.
Law--Interpretation and construction.--United States

KF425 / .E44 2008

348.732 / ELS
Last Updated on September 15, 2019
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