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Statutory default rules : how to interpret unclear legislation /

by Elhauge, Einer.
Material type: materialTypeLabelBookPublisher: Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press, 2008Description: vi, 386 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.ISBN: 9780674024601 (alk. paper); 0674024605 (alk. paper).Subject(s): Statutes -- United States | Law -- United States -- Interpretation and constructionOnline resources: Table of contents only
Contents:
Why courts should maximize enactable preferences when statutes are unclear -- The general theory for current preferences default rules -- Inferring current preferences from recent legislative action -- Inferring current preferences from agency action -- From legislative intent to probabilistic estimates of enactable preferences -- Moderation, unforeseen circumstances, and a theory of meaning -- Eliciting legislative preferences -- Canons favoring the politically powerless -- Linguistic canons of statutory construction -- Interpretations that may create international conflict -- Explaining seeming inconsistencies in statutory stare decisis -- Tracking the preferences of political subunits -- Tracking high court preferences -- The fit with prior political science models and empirical data -- Interest groups and collective choice theory -- Protecting reliance or avoiding change or effect -- Rebutting operational and jurisprudential objections.
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Non Fiction 348.732 ELS (Browse shelf) Available 477289

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Why courts should maximize enactable preferences when statutes are unclear -- The general theory for current preferences default rules -- Inferring current preferences from recent legislative action -- Inferring current preferences from agency action -- From legislative intent to probabilistic estimates of enactable preferences -- Moderation, unforeseen circumstances, and a theory of meaning -- Eliciting legislative preferences -- Canons favoring the politically powerless -- Linguistic canons of statutory construction -- Interpretations that may create international conflict -- Explaining seeming inconsistencies in statutory stare decisis -- Tracking the preferences of political subunits -- Tracking high court preferences -- The fit with prior political science models and empirical data -- Interest groups and collective choice theory -- Protecting reliance or avoiding change or effect -- Rebutting operational and jurisprudential objections.

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